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Abstract
Accurately predicting Operating and Support (O&S) costs is vital in the current
climate of budgetary constraints. However, there is an overall lack of research in the
realm of O&S which hinders cost estimator’s abilities to provide accurate sustainment
estimates. This research determines when Air Force Aircraft O&S costs stabilize and to
what degree. Stability is examined in three areas: total O&S costs, the six O&S cost
element structures, and aircraft type. Stability results vary by category but generally is
found to occur 80% of the time at approximately five years from Initial Operating
Capability (IOC). The second portion of this research employs a multiple regression
model to predict median O&S costs per total active aircraft in the inventory (CPTAI). All
O&S costs and variables for regression derived from the literature are collected using the
Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database. The model explains 87.24% of the
variance in the data set when predicting median O&S CPTAI. Results from this research
provide insight to cost estimators on when to start using actual O&S costs as a baseline
for estimates in lieu of analogous programs and provides a new parametric O&S
estimating tool designed as a cross-check to current estimating methodologies.
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I. Introduction
Chapter Overview
Every acquisition program funded by the Department of Defense (DoD) must
consider the costs of sustaining and maintaining the system past its acquisition phase.
Traditionally, the costs of the Operating and Support (O&S) phase has been
deemphasized with more attention on estimates for the acquisition phase (Ryan, Jacques,
Ritschel, and Schubert, 2013). Furthermore, DoD research from 1945-2008 has included
dozens of studies and commissions on the accuracy of acquisition cost estimates with no

published work on O&S estimates (Ryan et al., 2013) This lack of research in O&S costs
is puzzling given that O&S is typically the largest component of a platform’s life-cycle
cost. While conventional wisdom has typically considered O&S costs to be 70% of a
system’s total life-cycle costs, more recent research has found a mean of 50-55% with
large deviations depending on platform type (Jones, White, Ryan, and Ritschel, 2014).
More specifically for aircraft, Jones et al. (2014) found fighters had a mean of 52.99%
and cargo/tanker had a mean of 65.15%. While these numbers are lower than what has
been traditionally portrayed as the standard, they are still more than half of total life-cycle
costs. In addition to being a large portion of the life-cycle, O&S costs have risen on an
annual basis and therefore, require more scrutiny in the budgetary process.
O&S costs are hard to predict early in a program’s life-cycle because the aircraft
is often new and actual operational data may not exist. As a result, potential unexpected
problems may occur that results in additional O&S costs. On the other hand, new aircraft
may not experience as many problems as seasoned aircraft and significant costs in
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maintenance may not materialize early. These reasons make early O&S costs difficult to
estimate and may result in inaccurate budgets. DoD programs are examined closely in
today’s environment of budgetary constraints and an accurate estimate provides senior
leaders the data to make proper decisions. Large swings in year-to-year O&S costs may
cause budgetary realignment problems such as under-funding other programs or underexecution of funds. Thus, research into understanding stability properties in O&S costs is
needed. Knowing when stability occurs in a program is important for analysts when they
create long term O&S estimates because stabilized costs reduce uncertainty in the
estimate. Also, if it is determined that a program is stable then analysts can utilize actual
O&S data related to the platform’s performance for the out-year estimates instead of
relying on analogies, factors, or other cost estimating techniques. Previous research by
Jones et al. (2014) assumed that a program’s O&S costs would be considered “stable”
when at least 10% of the planned procured quantity were produced. The 10% inclusion
criterion was employed to simplify the data set; however, it was not tested with statistical
evidence and may not be an appropriate metric.
Outside major upgrades or mission changes, an aircraft’s O&S costs should
theoretically stabilize. However, a determination of when or what characteristics lead to
stability have not yet been explored. Despite this research gap, reporting policies for
O&S costs have been levied upon Air Force program offices. Current reporting under Air
Force Material Command’s (AFMC) Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER)
requires an acquisition program to report O&S costs and how they relate to previous
years. According to WSER, a program is considered “green” when the current O&S cost
is less than 15% of the 2-year historical average cost, “yellow” when the current O&S
2

cost is within 15% under or over the 2-year average cost, and “red” when current O&S
costs are over 15% of the 2-year average cost (Air Force Material Command, 2016).
These ranges may not be a good indicator of program success as early O&S costs vary for
a multitude of reasons.
Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to determine when O&S costs stabilize for Air Force
aircraft to add accuracy to cost estimates. This research is scoped to the all Air Force
aircraft in the inventory. Improving the accuracy of O&S estimates will aid decision
makers when deciding whether to start a new program or continue to fund O&S for an
established program. Furthermore, the research will determine a new data driven
threshold for reporting or validate whether the 15% currently used in WSER has merit.
Finally, a multiple regression model is made to determine total O&S costs per aircraft as
a top level cross check.
Research Questions
#1: Using the Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER) 15% threshold for
reporting as a baseline, what is the more accurate, data driven threshold for stability?
Analysis of WSER reporting guidelines and prior year O&S costs helps determine a datadriven threshold for when acquisition programs should be reporting O&S expenditure
issues.
#2: When can O&S costs of a program be considered stable? The database Air
Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) is utilized to pull actual O&S costs for each
aircraft to determine when they can be considered stable determined by years from Initial
3

Operational Capability (IOC). Air Force programs are examined but the method is
replicable with other service’s O&S costs.
#3: How do stability characteristics vary by platform type? AFTOC data is
grouped by aircraft platform type and then analyzed in these separate pairings.
#4: Using multiple regression, how accurately can we predict O&S costs for a
given year using explanatory variables? Programmatic data from AFTOC and other
sources are used to predict the O&S costs for given year. Relevant programmatic data are
total aircraft in the inventory (TAI), average age of fleet, flight hours, among others.
Methodology
Research questions one, two, and three require AFTOC O&S cost data for
analysis. Data needs to be standardized to ensure comparisons are equivalent. The
research standardizes years of cost data by the years from IOC. Additional
standardizations include cost per flying hour (CPFH) and cost per total aircraft (CPTAI)
for an accurate comparison from year to year. Once the data is standardized, calculations
for the percent change from year to year can be determined. With percent changes
calculated, we can determine when programs stabilize and how stable they are to a
certain percentage bound.
Regression analysis also requires the use of AFTOC cost data in addition to
programmatic data. The model building process is iterative and requires passing key
diagnostics. Once all diagnostics are passed it can then be validated with a separate
validation pool.

4

Scope and Limitations
The scope of this research is to analyze Air Force aircraft programs. Data
gathered in AFTOC is from 1996-2016. 2017 is excluded from this analysis to ensure
only full year expenditures are being examined. Aircraft are split into eight mission
categories provided by AFTOC: Bomber, Fighter/Attack, Helicopters, Reconnaissance,
Special Duty, Training, Transport/Tanker, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). While
the research is only focused on Air Force Aircraft, the relationships found may be
applicable to other types of programs or services. AFTOC is an authoritative resource of
actual O&S costs incurred by a program, but it is important to note that large databases
may have inconsistencies or errors in data. While there are potential issues, AFTOC is a
database maintained by contractors and is periodically updated when additional
information is received. Another limitation of this research is that some programs may
not have reached stabilized O&S costs due the infancy of the program.
Chapter Summary
The following chapter contains a literature review of the previous research
completed on O&S cost estimation as well as DoD guidance for O&S estimates. In
addition, the chapter includes information on the WSER and its application to stability
properties. Following the literature review is Chapter Three that outlines the
methodologies used to answer the research questions. Chapter Four outlines the stability
properties of programs as well as the results of the multiple regression to predict O&S
costs. The closing chapter discusses the implications of the research for decision makers
and potential areas for follow-on research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the importance of Operating and Support (O&S) costs in
the Department of Defense (DoD). Federal regulations and reports from independent
government agencies conveying the significance of these costs are included. Furthermore,
the guides for federal and DoD specific O&S cost estimates provide the reader with an
understanding of how these costs are calculated and which components are included.
Then provided is a review of the limited O&S cost estimate research to date, further
explaining why government agencies do not have an in-depth understanding on how to
estimate these costs. The driving force for analyzing stability properties in this research is
the Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER). The most recent WSER business rules
for O&S cost reporting are detailed. Definitions of stability in O&S cost estimates are not
clearly defined in previous research, therefore how this could be helpful in estimating
programs more accurately is investigated. Finally, analysis from Earned Value
Management (EVM) provides an insight on how stability properties may be calculated
for O&S cost estimates.
Emphasis on Operation and Support Costs
DoD programs typically have four main phases in the life cycle of a system:
Research & Development (R&D), Procurement (Investment), O&S, and Disposal.
However, the O&S and Disposal phases are usually combined for simplicity. Of these
phases, the largest cost by percentage of the total life-cycle has widely been accepted as
O&S (Jones, White, Ryan, & Ritschel, 2014). This widely accepted “golden rule” is that
6

70% of life cycle costs will be attributed to sustainment (O&S) costs. Figure 1 illustrates
the total life cycle costs and is adapted from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Assessment & Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE).

Figure 1. Illustrative System Life Cycle (OSD CAPE, 2014)
In the past, program offices focused less on O&S costs compared to the
acquisition costs, comprised of the R&D and Procurement phases. Acquisition programs
span from as a little as one year for a small weapon system to 15-20 years for entirely
new aircraft. Given the duration of the acquisition cycle, it is easy for program managers
(PMs) and other functional support staff to be extensively focused on near term goals and
affordability. PMs work on a program for a short number of years and then move to
another program. The focus is on near term program success and to ensure execution of
current year funding, especially with the uncertainty of future budgets. No matter how
hard a PM tries, it is impossible to predict problems and costs associated with

7

sustainment that may occur decades into the future. Understandably, there is a tradeoff
between focusing on present affordability and driving sustainability of costs down for
future managers of a program.
The focus on affordable R&D and Procurement costs in programs over O&S costs
is also reflected in academic research in the discipline. “Meanwhile, the O&S
sustainability considerations have been perennially neglected or subordinated to
acquisition requirements or program survival” (Ryan, Jacques, Ritschel, & Schubert,
2013). According to Ryan’s research, from 1945 to 2008, there were over 130 studies
focused on the acquisition of DoD systems, many of which involved the accuracy of the
cost estimates while not a single published study pertained to the accuracy of O&S cost
estimates (Ryan et. al., 2013). Without academic research and emphasis on the
importance of O&S, the techniques used to estimate these costs have improved little over
time.
However, more attention has been given to the O&S portion of the DoD budget in
recent years. Between political pressures and the ever-rising national debt, congress
created the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) in 2009. WSARA
dictates that “Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on growth in operating and support costs for major weapon systems”
(Public Law, 2009)
In addition to reporting cost growth, the act also dictates that if possible, service
and repair contracts for weapon systems must solicit competition to drive costs down.
This would help alleviate the budgetary pressures large defense contractors put on the
8

U.S. government by charging any price for sole source repair or maintenance contracts.
Finally, the Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(OSD CAPE) was created as result of WSARA to help carry out the act (Public Law,
2009). WSARA explicitly emphasizes O&S focus in a handful of facets and the latent
function is that the emphasis has spilled over into other areas within the DoD.
Two months before WSARA became law, the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) published its cost estimation guide to “establish a
consistent methodology that is based on best practices and that can be used across the
federal government for developing, managing, and evaluating capital program cost
estimates” (Government Accountability Office, 2009). The guide is a top-level approach
for all government programs, not just the DoD. According to the GAO, “A life-cycle cost
estimate provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and associated
cost elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program’s
life” (Government Accountability Office, 2009). Given financial issues in the country at
the time, government agencies began to focus on better spending practices moving
forward.
In 2010, just one year after WSARA, the GAO produced a report that concluded
the DoD does not effectively record and track O&S cost estimates throughout the lifecycle of a weapon system and needs to retain documentation to do so (Government
Accountability Office, 2010). For the programs GAO investigated, information for
estimates was missing and in some cases the cost estimates were never completed. At the
time of the report, DoD services failed to produce life-cycle O&S cost estimates for five
of the seven aviation systems reviewed (Government Accountability Office, 2010). The
9

lack of past data and less emphasis on O&S are likely reasons why the DoD was unable
to produce the deliverables for GAO.
In 2012, yet another report from the GAO was published, titled Improvements
Needed to Enhance Oversight of Estimated Long-term Costs for Operating and
Supporting Major Weapon Systems (Government Accountability Office, 2012). The
report concluded that the DoD does not do a sufficient job in reporting O&S costs in the
uniform fashion it is meant to. Program offices are supposed to report O&S cost data via
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). However, a large portion of programs were unable
to document some or all of the following: “(1) the explanatory information they included
with the cost estimates; (2) the source of the cost estimates they cited as the basis for the
reported costs; (3) the unit of measure they used to portray average costs; (4) the
frequency with which they updated reported costs; and (5) the reporting of costs for an
antecedent system being replaced by the new weapon system” (GAO, 2012). This
published report is further evidence that at the time the DoD was still having O&S cost
and reporting issues needing to be resolved.
Cost Estimation Guides
Prior to WSARA, the Office of The Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (OSD CAIG) was the DoD’s source for O&S cost estimation
guidelines. Original guidance came in 1992 and was improved upon in 2007. The
creation of OSD CAPE resulted in a new guide in 2014 for DoD components to develop
estimates of system operating and support costs (Office of the Secretary of Defense; Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation, 2014). The 100+ page guide is intended to be a
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handbook for cost analysts and ensures all aspects of O&S costs are captured in the
estimate. Though OSD CAIG had a similar breakdown of O&S costs, OSD CAPE’s
newest cost element structure is shown in Figure 2. Operation and support of weapon
systems may seem simple but the cost element structure provides an outline to the
complex list of costs that can make up an estimate.

Figure 2. OSD CAPE O&S Cost Estimating Categories (OSD CAPE, 2014)
The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) created the Air Force Cost
Analysis Handbook (AFCAH) in 2008. The handbook details how cost estimators should
create estimates for both acquisition and sustainment phases. However, the most recent
version came out before WSARA and the newfound emphasis on O&S costs. While the
guide extensively details cost estimation techniques for the acquisition phase it lacks
O&S techniques. For a general idea, there are 17 chapters in the AFCAH and only one
chapter details O&S cost estimation (Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, 2008). The
handbook also fails to consider stability when creating O&S cost estimates.
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One area where AFCAH acknowledges instability of O&S costs is with Interim
Contractor Support (ICS). After the Procurement phase of a program the system must be
sustained. For this temporary period, the logistics and maintenance support are completed
by the contractor. “[ICS] may be used when there is uncertainty in the type and level of
support required due to system, equipment, or end-item design instability that may put
the system’s logistics support elements at risk.” (AFCAA, 2008). While this allows
programs to hedge against risk for one to three years after production, this doesn’t help
cost estimators once support from the contractor has ended. ICS is discussed in the O&S
chapter of the AFCAH however it is budgeted for with procurement appropriations and is
considered while doing the acquisition cost estimate.
AFCAH acknowledges that O&S estimates are complex and recommends similar
cost estimation tools that are used in acquisition estimates such as parametric and
simulation tools. One simulation tool example is the estimation of steady-state depot
repair costs for depot level reparable (AFCAA, 2008.) The tool might be helpful but
steady-state (stability) is assumed and not guaranteed. Without stability, the tools
presented in this chapter may not have the same validity as when they are used in
estimating acquisition costs.
Research on Operation and Support Costs (Pre-WSARA)
While the recent emphasis on O&S costs has influenced academic research, there
are published works that considered the effects of these rising costs prior to WSARA.
The research reviewed in this chapter that came before WSARA speak to the cost effects
of aging aircraft and the “death spiral” associated with these costs. In Dixon’s
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dissertation, he explains that the spending “death spiral” is a cycle in which older
equipment require more funds to maintain, which, in turn, decreases the funds available
for new weapon systems (Dixon, 2005).
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) researched the effects of aging on O&S
costs for military equipment. CBO’s main purpose in their report was to answer two
questions: 1) Do aging equipment and the associated costs of operating and maintaining it
explain trends in total spending on O&M? 2) What can be learned from existing studies
and data about the relationship between the age of equipment and the costs of operating
and maintaining that equipment? (Congressional Budget Office, 2001). Total Operation
and Maintenance (O&M) is comprised of other components in addition to spending on
equipment. Other categories include but are not limited to: personnel, base maintenance,
environmental factors, base operating support, and communications. For further clarity,
O&M spending on equipment is considered O&S costs while the other components plus
O&S comprise total O&M. According to CBO, O&S costs only comprised around 20%
of the total O&M budget at the time of the study. The CBO study found that aging
aircraft may be causing increases in O&S costs but there is not sufficient evidence to
claim that it drives the total O&M budget up.
The second CBO research question is more general and aims to learn from
previous studies. In its report, the CBO analyzed prior research that used data to derive
relationships between aging aircraft and maintenance costs. Included in this analysis was
both individual aircraft studies and pooled aircraft studies. Individual studies refer to
studies that analyzed one aircraft at a time while pooled studies took a top-level approach
and aggregated data of multiple aircraft. One of the significant pooled studies included
13

was from the RAND corporation in 1990 (Hildebrandt & Sze, 1990). CBO replicated the
process with available Air Force Total Ownership Costs (AFTOC) data. This is Air Force
O&S data from a variety of aircraft platforms. Using data from 17 active aircraft from
1996-1999, they used the 68 observations to make a multiple regression tool to predict
O&S costs. The parameters used were:
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝑒𝑒

β values in the equation above are the coefficients for each term. CBO’s replication of the
1990 Rand equation with updated data resulted in an R2 = 0.71. In addition to the original
model, CBO added to the model by including dummy variables for aircraft type. The
actual data on the second model was not given in the report but it did say with 99 percent
confidence that the second model was more appropriate (Congressional Budget Office,
2001). The RAND model does not include stability in its variables but can provide a toplevel cross-check for analysts completing cost estimates.
In 2005, Dixon investigated the effects of aging aircraft on costs but focused on
the commercial sector rather than military. In his work, Dixon states the United States
military can use insights gained from the cost of aging commercial aircraft fleets for
long-term military aircraft maintenance estimates (Dixon, 2005). He found that the total
maintenance costs increase as the average fleet age increases. However, this increase is in
a decreasing fashion. Prior to Dixon’s investigation, consensus was that maintenance
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costs continue to increase due to aging fleets. The traditional thought would make the
curve of these costs have a cubic shape that has an increase in the Newness stage, a
leveling off in the Mature stage, and an increase in the Aging stage. Dixon designed his
methodology to recreate the accepted cubic curve and use the three categories that
Boeing used in its model to demonstrates costs of aging fleets. Figure 3 illustrates how
the costs of aircraft per flight hour are influenced by average fleet age. It is important to
note that the cost curve does not follow a cubic shape but rather a logarithmic. Also,
included are the three categories of aircraft age originally presented by Boeing.

Figure 3. Estimated Costs with Respect to Fleet Age (Dixon, 2005)
The research examined passenger airline aircraft which have a significantly
different flight mission compared to military aircraft. Due to this difference, the
applicability may be limited to certain types of aircraft or missions. Aircraft such as
tankers and cargo airlift are more analogous to commercial aircraft and may be able to
use the results as support for repair or replace decisions faced by senior leaders.
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Research on Operation and Support Costs (Post-WSARA)
Since the enactment of WSARA there has been a greater emphasis on O&S costs
and research in the field. Stephen Harrison, an Australian that used open source U.S. cost
data, tested the hypothesis that newer aircraft should have lower O&S costs but found
that costs are rising year to year. “The comparison of the O&S costs of 21 platforms and
their antecedent has shown that only seven of them are cheaper to operate” (Harrison,
2013). Improvements in technology would appear to drive maintenance costs down but
the evidence demonstrates that it may be cheaper to continue maintaining an old aircraft
than investing in a new aircraft for the same mission. In his research, he notes that the
reason given for the increase in O&S costs for the F-35 to its antecedent is due to the vast
jump in capability the new fighter has and must maintain.
In 2013 Ryan, Jacques, Ritschel, & Schubert found that “There tend to be large
errors in DoD O&S cost estimates, and that the accuracy of the estimates improves little
over time.” They also note that from 1945 to 2008 there were over 130 studies dedicated
to checking the accuracy of acquisition cost estimates and none focusing on O&S (Ryan
et al., 2013). For such a large portion of the life cycle costs it would be logical to assume
there would be more prior research in the field.
The widely accepted 70% ratio of O&S to life-cycle costs was further investigated
in 2014. AFCAH and the GAO cost estimating guide both have fixed wing aircraft R&D
costs at 20% of life cycle costs, procurement at 39%, and O&S at 41% (AFCAH, 2008.
GAO, 2009.) These values are inconsistent with the 70/30 rule referenced in other DoD
literature. The lack of data to back up the 70/30 rule drove Jones’ research. “O&S costs
vary by aircraft type and are a significant portion of costs but do not follow the traditional
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convention of being 70% of the life cycle” (Jones et al., 2014). Table 1 summarizes the
ratios Jones found for O&S costs to total life cycle costs based on aircraft platform. Jones
also investigated the ratios for ships, missiles, helicopters, electronic equipment, and tilt
rotor aircraft however the scope of this research only includes fixed wing aircraft.
Harrison (2013) also pointed out that it is more relevant to examine the ratio
percentage by group of common platform types. Highest deviators from the 70/30 rule in
his research include submarines at 40/60 and weapons at 10/90. The deviations of O&S
costs regardless of program type lend to the fact that they are difficult to accurately
estimate (Harrison, 2013).
Table 1. Summary of O&S Cost Percentages by Platform (Jones 2014)
Aircraft
Standard
Platform
Mean Median
Deviation
Fighter
52.99% 51.46%
15.65%
Cargo/Tanker
65.15% 61.73%
13.98%
Cargo/TankerNo KC-135R
59.94% 59.55%
9.68%
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles
(UAV)
71.56% 71.56%
9.39%
Weapon System Enterprise Review
In 2012, Air Force Material Command (AFMC) consolidated its 12 centers to the
five-center construct present today (Air Force Public Affairs, 2013). The restructuring led
to the development of Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) which
oversees many of the Air Force acquisition programs. One of LCMC’s responsibilities is
to execute the Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER). According to the 2016 draft
WSER business rules, “The WSER provides a comprehensive, integrated, timely,
rhythmic review focused on present and future health of Air Force weapon systems and
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AFMC materiel enterprise effectiveness in support of overall Integrated Life Cycle
Management (ILCM)” (Air Force Material Command, 2016). Program managers must
brief a program if it is deficient in one or more of the 12 metrics used to track the
program’s success. Examples of these metrics include aircraft availability, service life,
modernization, and logistics health assessment.
One of the metrics is the operating costs of a weapon system, synonymous with
O&S costs. If a program’s current year O&S costs are greater than 15% of the previous
two-year average cost then the program is considered red (deficient) and must be briefed
with its “Issues”, “Impacts”, “Way-Ahead”, and “Get Well Dates” (Air Force Material
Command, 2016). The subcategories of the O&S costs reported during the WSER are
illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4. O&S Cost Categories from the WSER Business Rules
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Tier 3 cost status (color) is determined by the sub-table on the right of the figure
and tier 2 status is determined by the worst-case cost status from tier 3. Tier 2 is the toplevel roll up costs of tier 3. The first category in tier 3 is Centralized Asset Management
(CAM) costs. The CAM category is comprised of the Weapon System Sustainment
(WSS) portfolio, Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) program, and may include other nonCAM costs such as U.S. Southern Command, Air Force Reserve, and Air National
Guard. The second category in tier 3 is Other Logistics Costs. Examples of these are all
logistics costs that are not captured in CAM such as unit level maintenance costs. The
final category in tier 3 is Other O&S Costs. These include any O&S costs in the portfolio
that are not related to logistics but rather the operations. Tier 4 costs are broken into three
categories; total cost, operational cost per flying hour (OCPFH), and cost per total aircraft
in the inventory (Cost per TAI).
Table 2 summarizes how costs are categorized in the WSER based on the CAIG
cost element structure. It is important to note that the OSD CAPE O&S cost element
structure from 2014 from figure 2 supersedes the CAIG cost element structures from
2007 but WSER uses CAIG elements to construct its tier 3 cost categories. Both cost
element structures are similar with minimal differences.
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Table 2. WSER Cost Category Alignment with CAIG Elements
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Stability in O&S Estimates
Stability is a term that has rarely been used in O&S cost estimation but is an
important characteristic. According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of stable as an
adjective, reads:
a: firmly established: fixed, steadfast stable opinions
b: not changing or fluctuating: unvarying in stable condition
c: permanent, enduring stable civilizations (Merriam-Webster, n.d.)
In the realm of O&S cost estimation, the closest definition of stability is costs that are not
changing or fluctuating. Nonetheless, sustainment is an ever-changing and fluid
component in the life cycle so a better definition of stability may be costs that are
minimally changing or fluctuating. Programs that can be considered to have stable O&S
costs provide the cost estimator with confidence and less uncertainty that the estimations
are correct. Once the program has reached stability, cost estimators can utilize the actual
previous year expenditures as a baseline for the estimate. This is a huge benefit that saves
time and relinquishes doubt that others may have in the estimate. Accurate cost
estimations lead to proper budgeting which leads to available funding and eventually
program success. Cost analysts have research tools and methods at their disposal to
properly estimate the acquisition phase but the lack of research in the O&S realm limits
the tools for the sustainment phase.
The only research that explicitly considers stability in its methods is Jones et al.,
2014. In their analysis of the ratio of O&S to acquisition costs they look at programs they
have deemed stable. In the research, a stable program is one that has produced at least
10% of the planned procurement quantities to avoid any ramp up affects that could skew
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costs (Jones et. al). In addition, there is no research to back up the 15% cost metric stated
in the WSER business rules. The 15% WSER metric was constructed by analysts at HQ
AFMC/A9, but may not have been derived through data analysis. Given prior research on
inaccuracy and difficulties in O&S cost estimates, this may not be a proper metric.
Knowing when a program’s O&S costs will stabilize provides another tool for analysts to
properly estimate the costs. At the very least it will provide clarity to those in the WSER
process who must report on cost overruns. Figure 5 depicts a notional program that
demonstrates stability within a 15% bound from year 2000 to around 2016. Assuming the
initial operational capability for this example started in 1996 the expected profile depicts
a ramp-up of costs at the beginning, a period of stability within the 15% bounds, and
escalating costs near the end of its 20-year useful life. While this is a textbook example,
deviations in actual programs from the trend are expected.
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Figure 5. Notional Example of Stability Properties in O&S Costs
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Lessons from Earned Value Management
While stability has essentially not been analyzed in O&S costs, Earned Value
Management (EVM) is an area where stability properties have been researched. EVM is a
tool the DoD uses to measure performance of acquisition contracts by tracking costs and
schedule. One particular methodology to determine stability in EVM uses the Cost
Performance Index (CPI). CPI is the ratio of cumulative scheduled costs over time to
actual costs incurred over the same period. A CPI greater than 1.0 indicates that the
project is under cost and favorable while a CPI of less than 1.0 indicates a project with
cost overruns and unfavorable. Christensen and Payne state, “A stable CPI may thus
indicate that the contractor’s estimated final costs of the authorized work, termed
“Estimated at Completion,” are reliable.” (Christensen & Payne, 1992).
Petter (2015) expands on the research of Christensen and Payne by further
investigating CPI and stability of earned schedule’s (ES) schedule performance index
(SPI(t)) (Petter, Ritschel, & White III, 2015). Using the data EVM provides, his
methodology includes three definitions of stability that have been researched in the field.
The first definition states stability is when the range from the maximum to minimum CPI
or SPI(t) is no greater than 0.2. The second definition declares stability when the final
CPI is less than +/- 0.1 away from the CPI at a certain percent complete. The last
definition of stability is when the final CPI is less than +/- 10% away from the CPI at a
certain percent complete. (Petter et al., 2015).
These definitions of stability work for contracts because they have start and finish
dates whereas O&S costs have a more perpetual nature. This is because it is easy to track
percent complete in EVM while definitive end dates of O&S costs are uncertain. The
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second and third definitions utilize a final CPI value and their transferability to O&S
costs may be difficult to determine without making assumptions on when a platform will
be decommissioned. However, the first definition is closer in the line with the 15%
definition implicitly given by the WSER. Using the first definition in Petter’s work and
the definition demonstrated by WSER, O&S cost data can be used to determine stability
similar manner by using percent differences between years.
Chapter Summary
Over the years O&S costs have garnered more attention than in the past, however
research still needs to catch up with this new interest. This literature review presented the
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) and how it is a major catalyst for the
recent emphasis. Then provided were cost estimation guides authored by a variety of
government agencies such as Air Force, OSD CAPE, and GAO. While the guides aim to
help analysts estimate weapon system costs, there is room for improvement, especially
with the tools used to estimate O&S costs. Also outlined is the previous research related
to O&S costs, both before and after WSARA. Next the review introduces the Weapon
System Enterprise Review (WSER) which is the primary reporting avenue of O&S costs
for Air Force program managers. WSER hints slightly to stability by deeming programs
deficient if the current cost is greater than 15% of the previous two-year average. This
may or may not be a good metric for reporting and is one gap this research aims to fill.
Stability in O&S cost estimates, an area that is completely lacking in the field is then
discussed. Stability is important because it allows cost estimators to use previous year
actual costs as a baseline for estimates and reduce uncertainty. There have been no
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research studies on stability properties regarding O&S costs but EVM does for CPI
stability. EVM stability is not completely transferable to O&S costs but does provide a
sound methodology to analyze stability in general. Chapter three will further expand on
the methodology used to fill the stability gap for O&S costs.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter explains the methodologies used to gather and analyze the Operating
& Support (O&S) cost data to determine stability properties and create a mathematical
model to predict O&S costs. Initially, it discusses the source of the cost data, how it is
collected, and how it is screened. Analysis includes programmatic information in addition
to the O&S cost data. The first part of this methodology discusses processes to determine
stability properties. This includes categorization and standardization of the data, the
metrics used, how and why the data is truncated, mean percent differences, testing
bounds to determine stability, and finally stability properties by aircraft type.
The second part of this methodology outlines the process to create a multiple
regression model. Data from the first portion is used but needs further screening due to
the addition of predictor variables. Once screened, the model building process is
explained along with the diagnostics used to test assumptions. Finally, the process in
which the model is validated and completed is discussed.
Operating and Support Cost Data
The main data used in this research includes the annual O&S costs for 44 aircraft
programs. The research scope is limited to fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft in the Air
Force inventory. Research is also limited to expenditures from 1996-2016 because the
Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) raw database does not contain data prior to
1996 or expenditures from 2017 at the time of this analysis. AFTOC provides costs in
base-year dollars as well as then-year dollars. For this research, all costs used are in base26

year 2016 to remove the effects of inflation. Air Force aircraft are the only programs
included, however the same process can be applied to other DoD services with an
adequate O&S cost database analogous to AFTOC.
Data Collection
AFTOC is a database that compiles the O&S costs of Air Force aircraft in one
location and is the best source to obtain this data. Data can be pulled as a user-friendly
pivot table created in Microsoft® Excel or a raw Excel database containing 233 columns
and 15,243 rows of data. The pivot table allows the user to compile and screen data easier
than the AFTOC raw database. However, the database was manipulated using R, an open
source data science programming language. Using R and the pivot table together allowed
the research team to manipulate the data in a way that stability and regression analysis
could be completed.
The cost data is broken down into the six O&S cost element structures (CES)
created by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) in 1992, revised in 2007, and
revised again by the Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) in 2014. Data
is also compiled for a top-level cumulative cost that includes all CES. For the purposes of
stability research, CES 6 (indirect costs) is not analyzed by itself because programs do
not allocate these costs in a standardized fashion. The top-level costs used in stability and
regression analysis do however include the indirect costs in the summation. Data from
AFTOC also includes programmatic information such as the total active inventory (TAI)
and flying hours per aircraft which is important for the standardization process in stability
determination. Additional AFTOC programmatic data used for the regression analysis
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includes average age of aircraft, location of lead logistics center, operational mission
type, and average unit cost, among others.
In addition to the data collected from AFTOC, Selected Acquisition Reports
(SAR) provide programmatic data relevant to both stability and regression. The Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) dates are needed and sourced from SARs to determine how
many years it takes to reach stability from IOC. Deagel.com and AF.mil are also used for
IOC dates and cross validation from SARs.
Screening of Base Data Set
AFTOC provides the Mission Design (MD) and Mission Design Series (MDS) for
each aircraft which are used in the initial screening. For example, the F-15A’s Mission
Design is F-15 while its Mission Design Series is F-15A. The programs included in the
research consist of MD programs that have a TAI of at least 10 in one of its years of data
and at least 5 years of data for each MDS to be included. These two screening criteria
ensure enough data points are available to form a trend and the aircraft chosen is
significant enough to be analogous to other programs. The final screening is that IOC
year is available so that the standardization process of “time from IOC” can be
calculated. The final base data set consisted of 32 MDs and 57 MDSs however searching
for IOC dates resulted in some MDSs being the same. In these cases, the MDSs are
grouped with all other MDSs of the same MD with the same IOC date. Table 3 shows the
screening steps to get to the final 44 programs used and Table 4 lists all the icluded
programs by aircraft platform type. The final base data set is used for stability and
regression analysis, although further independent screening is needed.
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Table 3. Process of Screening Base Data Set
Screen

Remaining MD
158
62
56
32

AFTOC
MD TAI >10
MDS Years data >5
Available IOC date
Grouped by IOC Date

Remaining
MDS
274
146
110
57
Programs
44

Table 4. Programs Selected for Base Data Set by Aircraft Type
Fighter/Attack
A-10C
A/OA-10
F-117A
F-15A
F-15B
F-15C
F-15D
F-15E
F-16A
F-16B
F-16C
F-16D
F-22A
Bomber
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H

Reconnaissance
E-3B/C
E-8C
U-2S
Special Duty
AC-130H/U
EC-130E/H
EC-130J
MC-130E/H
MC-130P
Training
T-1A
T-38A/C
T-6A
UAV/Drone
MQ-1B
MQ-9A
RQ-4B

Helicopter
HH-60G
MH-53J/M
UH-1H/N
Transport/Tanker
C-130E/H
C-130J
C-141B/C
C-17A
C-21A
C-5A/B
C-5M
CV-22B
HC-130P/N
KC-10A
KC-135E/R

Part 1. Stability Analysis
Standardization and Categorization
Once the data is collected and initially screened, part 1 of this chapter explains the
methodology to determine stability properties of aircraft. The data is standardized by cost
per flying hour (CPFH) and cost per TAI (CPTAI) to control for the variance in hours
flown or number of aircraft in the inventory. CPFH is the total annual cost divided by the
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total number of flying hours flown that same year. CPTAI is the total annual cost divided
by the average number of aircraft in the inventory that year. These calculations are also
used when analyzing the five different CESs as CPFH and CPTAI are broken into the
five cost elements included in the research. The three cost categories the Weapon System
Enterprise Review (WSER) breaks up O&S costs into are also inspected for stability. The
WSER categories summarized in figure 4 of Chapter II are Centralized Asset
Management (CAM) costs, Other Logistics Costs, and Other O&S Costs. For simplicity
in our research, CAM costs are designated as WSER category 1, Other Logistics Costs
are designated as WSER 2, and Other O&S costs are designated WSER category 3.
Figure 5 in Chapter II outlines how the WSER sorts the 2007 CAIG cost categories into
its three cost categories and is used in compiling the data. Another reason to standardize
in this manner is that WSER asks to compare current O&S costs to the previous two-year
average by TAI and CPFH. As a cross check, the Excel pivot table from AFTOC gives
values for cost per TAI and CPFH, which are compared to the calculated values for the
given year.
The “time from IOC” is calculated by subtracting the IOC year of a certain
program from each year of the O&S cost data. All data is from 1996-2016 but the aircraft
included are at different points in the sustainment phase. For example, in 2010 the C-17A
is 17 years from IOC while the F-22A is only 5 years from IOC. When all data points are
compiled, this allows the trends to be seen from “time from IOC” not just the 20-year
period of data available for a specific program. The month of the IOC year is also ignored
for simplicity and could be a slight limitation.
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Stability Metrics
To test stability, we must first clarify the two-metrics used in the analysis. The
first comes from the WSER while the second is more practical for cost estimators.
Stability derived from the WSER is when a program incurs annual costs no greater than
15% of the previous two-year average costs. The WSER does not explicitly state stability
but uses this calculation as a cut off for reporting deficient O&S costs. For example, if we
want to assess the stability at year 1998, and the 1996 and 1997 annual costs were $1
million and $2 million respectively, then the two-year average cost would be $1.5
million. If 1998 incurred costs of $1.6 million then the percent difference would be:
|% 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑| = �

$1.6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − $1.5 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
� × 100% = 6.67%
$1.5 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

Given the WSER metric of stability, the 1998 cost would be considered stable because it
is less than 15%. Recall that in the WSER, if a program’s O&S costs are more than 15%
above the two-year average it is considered “red” and deficient. The equation includes
absolute values because the magnitude of the difference is all that is important for
stability, not whether costs are trending up or down.
The second definition of stability that is useful to cost estimators is similar but
uses the year to year percent cost difference rather than comparing costs to the two-year
average. For this analysis, the six CAIG/CAPE cost categories are used. Again, only the
first 5 CES are analyzed individually because indirect costs are levied on programs
differently but CES 6 is used in total costs. A cost estimator wants to know when to start
using actual costs as a basis for an estimate and will be able to do so once it is determined
the program has stabilized. O&S cost estimates are developed using the CAIG/CAPE
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categories and any trends at these levels are valuable to the estimator. The methodology
of when programs become stable is similar for the two metrics and the combinations of
metric, cost category, and type of cost are summarized in Table 5. This results in 9
combinations for the WSER metric and 18 combinations for the Year to Year metric.
Table 5. Combinations of Stability Properties Analyzed
Metric
WSER
(2 Year Avg)
Year to Year

Category
WSER 1. CAM Costs
WSER 2. Other Logistics Costs
WSER 3. Other O&S Costs
Total O&S Cost
CES 1. Unit-Level Manpower
CES 2. Unit Operations
CES 3. Maintenance
CES 4. Sustaining Support
CES 5. Continuing System Improvements

Type of Cost
Total Costs
Cost Per Fly Hour (CPFH)
Cost Per TAI (CPTAI)
Total Costs
Cost Per Fly Hour (CPFH)
Cost Per TAI (CPTAI)

Truncation
The 44 selected programs have IOCs ranging from 1 to 57 years from IOC. The
research is determining where stability occurs and we are truncating to OSD CAPE’s
notional Service Life Durations. Shown in table 6, the highest nominal service life
duration between fixed wing and rotary wing is 40 years and is the point of truncation
(Office of the Secretary of Defense; Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, 2014).
Jones (2014), used the OSD CAPE draft estimating guide for his research in finding the
ratio of O&S costs to development costs and concluded services lives of 20-30 years for
Fighters and Helicopters and 30-40 years for cargo, bomber, and tanker aircraft. Given
these two determinations of service life, separate analysis is conducted for up to 30 years
from IOC and from 30-40 years from IOC. This also allows the team to see if there is an
aging effect on the data. The base data set has 765 program and year pairs (e.g. F-15A in
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1998) while the truncated set has 681, which means only 10.98% of the data points are
removed for truncation.
Table 6. Nominal Service Life Durations (OSD CAPE)
Commodity
Fixed Wing Aircraft

Rotary Wing Aircraft

Sub-Commodity
Fighter
Cargo
Tanker
C4ISR
CSAR
Trainer
Attack
Utility
Cargo

Service Life (Years)
20-25
25-30
40
20-25
30
30-35
20-30
20-30
20-30

Mean Percent Difference for Years from IOC
Determining stability involves compiling all the years of cost data for all
programs. Each data point consists of a time from IOC and a percent difference in cost
from the previous year or two-year average. The mean percent difference in costs for
each year from IOC is then calculated. For a notional example, at 10 years from IOC, the
B-2A (2007) has a percent difference of 21.15%, C-130J (2009) is 11.56%, and F-22A
(2015) is 18.34%. These programs reached 10 years from IOC at different calendar years
but the mean percent difference for 10 years from IOC would be 17.02%. The mean
percent difference is chosen rather than the median percent difference because means
skew the research toward instability (high percentages), making the analysis more
conservative. Once the mean percent difference is calculated for each year from IOC we
can determine at which “time from IOC” the costs stabilize by testing bounds.
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Testing Bounds
WSER metric: Research question #1 asks if the 15% bound generated by the
WSER is a good metric or if there is a better, data driven number? To answer this
question, we look at the means for each year from IOC for each cost combination and
using a bound threshold, determine the year it falls within the bound. The process starts at
a 20% bound and determines the first point from IOC the mean falls within the bound.
The percent of time it stays within the 20% bound is calculated from the stability point to
30 years as well as the stability point to 40 years. If the mean percent difference falls
within the 20% bound 80% of the time or more to 30 years we conduct the same process
at the 15% bound. The percent stable to 40 years is not used in the selection of the best
bound because there may be some aging affect. The process is repeated for the 10% and
5% bound if applicable. If a cost combination is not stable 80% of the time, then the
previous bound is selected as the best bound. 80% is the cutoff selected because O&S
costs have an uncertain nature, and it is highly unlikely that they will be stable 100% of
the time. To provide a data driven number, the mean, standard deviation, and median are
calculated for the values from the stability point to 30 years from IOC. The same
descriptive statistics are also calculated for years 30-40 to see if any aging affects are
present. This is needed because combinations may have different stability points at
certain bounds.
Year to year metric: The process for the year to year metric is identical but
includes more robust results. The WSER needs to know stability points for reporting
present values, whereas cost estimators are making estimates in the out-years. The
process starts at the 20% bound and determines the first point from IOC that the mean
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falls within the bound. The percent of time that it stays within the 20% bound is
calculated from the stability point to 30 years as well as the stability point to 40 years. If
the mean percent difference across all years falls within the 20% bound 50% of the time
or more we conduct the same process at the 15% bound. Being stable 50% of the time is
our cut off because it is the point where the means are either more stable or more
unstable. This process is completed for all 18 combinations of the year to year metric
down to the 5% bound, if applicable.
Once the points of stability are determined for each combination and at each
bound, the best bound for each combination is chosen to run descriptive statistics on.
Like the WSER metric, the best bound is chosen as the last bound to have at least 80%
stability from the point that it falls within the bound to 30 years from IOC. If the means
do fall within a bound 100% of the time it is likely that the bound is too wide which isn’t
helpful to estimators or decision makers. The Year to Year metric includes summary
statistics for the best bound but also illustrates the properties at tighter bounds that don’t
exhibit stability 80% of the time should a decision maker be willing to take more risk.
Stability Properties by Aircraft Type
Research question #3 aims to determine if stability properties vary by aircraft
type. When comparing by aircraft type this research focuses on the Year to Year metric
of stability because the WSER uses the same metric for all programs regardless of the
aircraft platform type. Conversely, cost estimators want to know the stability properties
of the type of aircraft being estimated. The process to find the mean percent difference by
year from IOC is the same but is calculated only with aircraft of a certain type. The
aircraft are broken into the 8 operational mission types given by AFTOC and include
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Bomber, Fighter/Attack, Helicopter, Reconnaissance, Special Duty, Training,
Transport/Tanker, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Once mean percent
differences are found, the bounds are tested. It is important to note that splitting the 44
programs into 8 categorizes drastically reduces the number of data points for each aircraft
type and is summarized in Table 7. Furthermore, an aircraft type that has a small number
of programs may not have data points all the way to 30 or 40 years from IOC and is
adjusted depending on the available data. A table of properties at each bound is created as
well as descriptive statistics if viable.
Table 7. Data Points Used to Calculate Mean for Each Year from IOC by Aircraft
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Part 2. Multiple Regression Analysis
Predicting O&S Costs for a Given Year
The second part of this chapter describes the process to create a mathematical
model to predict the top-level O&S costs per aircraft. A robust multiple regression model
is useful for cost estimators as a cross check to other cost estimation methods. The
starting point for this regression model is a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) model
created in 2001 (Congressional Budget Office, 2001). In their research, CBO built off the
RAND model and used 68 observations. The model included 17 programs and 4 years of
O&S cost data pulled from the AFTOC database. The final equation from CBO is shown
in Equation 1. CBO had success but a model with 20 years of O&S cost data and 44
programs provides a much more robust model. In addition to being a top-level cross
check, this model can be used for rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates if no other
O&S cost data is available for a certain program.
Equation 1:
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
+ 𝜀𝜀

Response Variable
The dependent variable in this regression analysis is the cost per TAI. This is a
total O&S cost that includes all six O&S cost element structures. TAI is the average total
aircraft in the inventory for a specified year.
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Predictor Variables
The AFTOC database provides O&S costs as well as programmatic information
that is used to create independent, predictor variables. Examples of programmatic data
provided in the database include average age of aircraft, location of lead logistics center,
operational mission type, average unit cost, among others discussed in Chapter IV.
Results from the stability analysis provide predictor variables for the years from IOC and
point of stability.
Rescreening of Base Data Set
The base data set of 44 programs is used for this portion of analysis, however
given the added variables, it must be rescreened to properly be used for regression. Note,
no truncation of the years from IOC is included for regression to provide for an allinclusive model. The only cost being used in this analysis is the total cost per TAI, the
response variable. The first screen is to remove data points that are years before IOC or
the year of IOC which ensures all observations start at 1 year from IOC. Each program
and “years from IOC” pair must also have only one value for each potential predictor
variable. This screen resulted in five grouped programs that had two different unit-costs
and one grouped program with two different logistics centers. The five grouped programs
with different unit-costs include C-141B/C, KC-135E/R, MH-53J/M, T-38A/C, and UH1H/N. These programs had major overhauls at some point in their service life that created
a new aircraft variant (MDS) and resulted in removal from the data set. The program with
two logistics centers is the EC-130E/H and is included in the regression data set because
location of logistics center is a binary variable that may influence the O&S cost. The final
screen necessary for multiple regression is that all potential variables have a specified
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value, a screen that JMP completes automatically when building a model. The final
regression data set has 708 rows of data however the final automatic screen that JMP
completes results in 609 data points used for modeling. Table 8 summarizes the
rescreening steps of the base data set used for regression analysis.
Table 8. Rescreening of Base Data Set
Screen
Base Data Set
Years from IOC < 1
Duplicate Unit Costs
Has value for each variable

Programs
44
44
39
39

Observations
Remaining
994
892
708
609

Validation Pool
A portion of the data is set aside from the regression model to serve as a
validation pool. For this research, we randomly choose 80% of the final data set to create
the multiple regression model and 20% to validate the model. The accuracy of the model
is tested using the 20% validation pool. To complete this, a random uniform distribution
variable ranging from 0 to 1 is first created in JMP Pro®. Then a variable called
Model/Test is created and using the if function, any data row that has the random uniform
variable value above 0.8 is designated Test while anything at or below 0.8 is designated
Model. Of the 609 data points included in the model, 484 (79.47%) were designated as
Model and 125 (20.53%) are designated as Test.
Model Building Process and Diagnostics
Model building is an iterative process and doesn’t follow one prescribed path. For
the purposes of this research, we use the stepwise function in JMP to determine which
predictor variables are initially included in the model. We utilize the stepwise function in
JMP and a p-value threshold of 0.05 as the threshold to enter or exit model. The mixed
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direction option is used in lieu of forward or backward options because the variable needs
to be significant to enter the model and remain significant when other variables are input.
Variables may or may not be included in the model depending on individual significance
and contingent on passing regression diagnostics. The diagnostics that the model must
pass are Holm-Bonferroni Correction, Variance Inflation Factors, Cook’s D test, analysis
of studentized residuals, Shapiro-Wilk test, and Breusch-Pagan test. Once all diagnostics
are passed, we test the preliminary model comprised of 80% of the data points to the
validation pool of 20%. If the results are similar, as determined by mean absolute percent
error (MAPE) and median absolute percent error (MdAPE), then the final model is
validated and remade using all data points.
Holm-Bonferroni Correction
Holm-Bonferroni correction is where the accepted alpha value must be divided by
the total number of variables in the model to counteract the problem with multiple
comparisons. If the model has an alpha of 0.05 and there are 5 variables then each
variable must have a p-value of less than 0.01. This ensures that every variable is truly a
predictor variable and reduces type 1 error of false positives.
Variance Inflation Factors
When creating any regression model, we must check variance inflation factor
(VIF) scores of the predictor variables. This gets rid of multicollinearity that may exist
between the factors. If two factors are linearly dependent, then only one is needed as a
predictor variable. “A VIF of 10 suggests that it is large enough to indicate a problem”
(Stine, 1995).
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Cook’s Distance Test
Overly influential observations may skew the results of the model. Cook’s
Distance Test (Cook’s D) is one method to test for these skewing data points. Data points
that may be overly influential may inform the model builder that more data points are
needed for that specific range or that the data point may be an error. When completing
the Cook’s D test, we screen for data points with a value higher than 0.5 for potential
exclusion.
Studentized Residuals
In addition to checking for overly influential points and areas, we also check for
outliers within the data. A histogram of the studentized residuals determines which points
are considered outliers and can be removed. If there are too many points outside of three
standard deviations then they may not be considered outliers and the data could just not
be normally distributed.
Shapiro-Wilk’s Test
The multiple regression model must also have its residuals pass the assumption of
being normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk’s test determines whether the data set can
be considered normally distributed. In this research, a threshold of α = 0.05 is used to
ensure the p-values of our predictor variables are valid. The null hypothesis in the
Shapiro-Wilk’s test is that the model has normally distributed residuals. If a p-value is
higher than 0.05, then our model’s data passes the assumption of normality.
Breusch-Pagan Test
Next, we test our final model assumption of constant variance of the error term
using the Breusch-Pagan test. Heteroscedasticity is present when the predictor variables
41

do not exhibit constant variance. The most robust regression models have as close to
equal constant variance as possible. Similar to Shapiro-Wilk’s test, Breusch-Pagan’s null
hypothesis is that there is constant variance. Passing the assumption of constant variance
using the Breusch-Pagan test requires a p-value above 0.05. If constant variance is not
present, natural logarithmic transformation of the response or predictor variables can be
used to reduce heteroscedasticity.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The last step of our model building process is finalizing the model. Once all prior
criteria are met, the structure of the finalized model reflects the standard linear multiple
regression equation, shown in Equation 2 (McClave et al., 2001:557).
Equation 2:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 … + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Where:
Yi - Outcome of Dependent Variable (response) for ith experimental/sample unit
Xi - Level of Independent (predictor) variable for ith experimental/sample unit
β0 +β1X1i : Linear /systematic relation between Yi and Xi (conditional mean)
β0: Mean of Y when X=0 (Y-intercept)
β1: Change in mean of Y when X increases by 1 (slope)
εi- Random error term
The descriptive performance measures of the multiple regression model are R2
and adjusted R2 and statistical measure how well the data fits the regression line.
Adjusted R2 is affected by the number of predictor variables in the model while R2 is not.
An R2 of 1 explains all the variance while 0 indicates the model explains no variance in
the data. Adjusted R2 only increases when the addition of a variable increases R2 as well
and ensures that the predictability of added variables warrants an increase in complexity.
Equation 3 is the calculation of Adjusted R2 (McClave et al., 2001:557).
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Equation 3:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅2 = 1 − �

(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
� (1 − 𝑅𝑅2 )
𝑛𝑛 − (𝑘𝑘 + 1)

Where:
n= the number of data points
k= the number of independent variables in the model
Validation of Multiple Regression Model

Once the model has been created it is tested against our 20% validation pool for
accuracy. The absolute percent error (APE) is calculated by subtracting predicted model
values from actual values and then dividing by the actual value. Recall MAPE and
MdAPE are mean and median values for APE. Once MAPE and MdAPE are calculated
for the model set (80%) and test set (20%), we compare results for consistency. Then a
bivariate plot of actual values vs. predicted values for the model and test sets is utilized to
compare the regression line of each graph. If the model set and test set compare similarly
to each other using MAPE, MdAPE, and bivariate plots, then the model is validated. The
last step is to compile all 609 data points back into a final, complete model.
Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the research methodology used to collect and screen data
as well as analyze for stability properties and complete regression analysis. The research
team uses AFTOC O&S cost data and IOC years from multiple sources for stability
analysis and adds other AFTOC programmatic information for regression analysis. The
methodologies present are justified based on prior research in addition to some
assumptions that had to be made based on the available data. Chapter IV presents the
results of the analysis using the methodologies presented in this chapter.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the results of the methodology outlined in Chapter III. The
chapter is organized into two sections of results. The first section includes analysis of
stability properties while the second section displays the developed multiple regression
model to predict annual O&S cost per total active inventory (Cost per TAI). Stability is
determined for the Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER) metric as well as the
Year to Year metric. The process starts with finding mean percent differences of costs
given a time from Initial Operational Capability (IOC), determining the appropriate
bound, and running descriptive statistics to provide a data driven stability point. Analysis
of stability properties by aircraft type is limited by sample size but provides the results
from testing bounds and descriptive statistics where appropriate.
The multiple regression section includes the results from creating a preliminary
model, diagnostic tests used to analyze the model, and a final model to predict total O&S
cost per TAI. Finally, the model is tested on the 20% validation pool using Mean
Absolute Percent Error (MAPE), Median Absolute Percent Error (MdAPE), and
regression fitting of bivariate actual vs. predicted plots to measure the performance of the
model. The explanatory power is assessed using R2 and adjusted R2 values.
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Part 1. Stability Analysis
Recall from Chapter III that the stability point is determined for both the WSER
and Year to Year metrics starting with the 20% bound. If a cost combination is 80%
stable at the 20% bound further investigated to the 15%, 10%, and 5% bounds when
applicable. Stability is found when the mean percent difference at a given time from IOC
falls within the tested bound. Figure 6 displays the number of programs used in the
calculations of means for each year from IOC. Note that these are the number of
programs used in the calculation of the total O&S category; the number of programs
utilized in the calculation for other categories may deviate slightly from Figure 6 due to
missing data points.

Figure 6. Number of Programs Used to Calculate Mean % Difference
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Determining Stability For WSER
Research question #1 aims to determine a data driven point of stability for use in
the WSER. The process starts by calculating the mean percent difference of each time
from IOC for the nine combinations included in the WSER metric of stability. WSER
stability is measured by calculating percent differences from the previous two-year
average. Table 9 summarizes the mean percent differences for all WSER combinations.
Note that there are no data points for the first year because the calculation requires the
two-year prior average. Using table 1 and the 20% bound allows us to see the point of
stability for each cost combination. In our analysis, only cost combinations WSER 2,
CPTAI WSER 2, and CPTAI WSER 3 have stability 80% of the time at the lower 15%
bound. CPFH WSER 1 and CPTAI WSER 1, which are both Centralized Asset
Management (CAM) costs did not reach 80% stability at the 20% bound. No cost
combinations make it to the 10% or 5% bound for the WSER.
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Table 9. Mean Percent Differences for WSER Combinations
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With the point of stability determined at the appropriate bound, the mean,
standard deviation, and median of the stable values are calculated to provide insight on
what the stability bound may actually be. This is calculated from the point of stability to
30 years from IOC and from 30 to 40 years to check for aging effects. Results are
displayed in Table 10. In addition to the descriptive statistics is the percent of time that
the costs stay within the chosen bound. In six of the nine WSER combinations there
appears to be an aging affect where the percent of time it stays within the bound
decreases past 30 years. The means and medians on five of those six also are larger which
further shows some aging affect.
Table 10. Summary Statistics for WSER Combinations

48

Determining Stability for Year to Year Metric
Stability using the year to year metric is calculated the same but with an added
step to show the best bound selection and properties at tighter bounds. Table 11 shows
the mean percent differences for cost per TAI at each year from IOC, up to 40 years. The
table displays total cost per TAI and the 5 O&S cost element structures (CES) per TAI.
Tables for total O&S cost and cost per fly hour (CPFH) are attached in Appendix A and
demonstrate similar characteristics. CES 4 and 5 do not fall under the 20% threshold at
any point and are removed from further analysis in this chapter. While it may seem
troublesome to remove two of the five categories, O’Hanlon (2018) determined that
CESs 1, 2, and 3 make up the majority of O&S costs with a mean of 82.39% and median
of 80.53%. (O’Hanlon, 2018).
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Table 11. Mean Percent Difference for Cost per TAI
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The next step is to start at the 20% threshold and determine a stability point. Then
the percentage of time that the means stay within the bound is calculated. If means
demonstrate more than 50% stability at the 20% bound it is checked at the 15% bound.
This process is repeated down to the 5% bound when applicable. The percent stable is
also calculated from the point of stability to 40 years from IOC to detect any aging
affects. After all bounds are explored, the best bound for stability is determined by
selecting the tightest bound that had at least 80% stability. Table 12 shows all
calculations of percent stable and highlighted is the best bound selection. Once the best
bound is selected, summary statistics are calculated for each combination to include
mean, standard deviation, and median as displayed in Table 12.
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Table 12. Exploration of Bounds and “Best” Bound Selection
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For further clarification in the process, we investigate CPTAI CES 1 and CPTAI
CES 2 because they have different bounds selected and different times to stability. As
shown in Table 4, both pass through the 20% threshold after 3 years from IOC with CES
1 remaining within the bound 100% of the time to 30 years and CES 2 88.89% of the
time. At the 15% bound, CES 1 reaches stability after 4 years with 100% stability to 30
years and CES 2 reaches stability after 6 years with 83.33% stability. At the 10% bound,
CES 1 reaches stability after 8 years with 86.3% stability while CES passes the threshold
after 12 years and only remains stable 27.78% of the time to 30 years. This means that
CPTAI CES 1’s best bound is 10% while CPTAI CES 2’s best bound is 15%. Using the
best bound selection, Table 5 shows that CPTAI CES 1 has a mean of 8.15% and median
of 8.06% while CPTAI CES 2 has mean of 12.63% and median of 12.03%. The use of
the bound selection and descriptive statistics provide cost estimators with a clearer
picture on the stability properties for each cost combination.
Looking at Table 13, several important conclusions can be drawn from the data.
For instance, CES 1 (manpower) and 2 (unit operations) have much lower means and
medians than CES 3 (maintenance) which could be because manpower and pay is fairly
constant. Flight hours can be mandated by law and have a more consistent nature to them
as well. Maintenance is much harder to predict and could be why less stability is
exhibited in CES 3 across all cost combinations. The cost type that has the tightest best
bounds looks to be cost per TAI and it also has lower means and medians than the other
two cost categories. In addition to the conclusions across cost type and cost categories,
there appears to be aging affects in total costs and cost per TAI but not for cost per fly
hour combinations. The means and medians for these groups rise and the percent stable
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from 30 years to 40 years from IOC decrease. The opposite is true with CPFH, where
means and medians decrease while percent stable increases.
Table 13. Summary Statistics for Year to Year Metric (Excluding CES 4 & 5)

Stability Properties by Aircraft Platform Type
Research question #3 asks if there are any differences in stability properties based
on aircraft type. The sample size to calculate means drops drastically when splitting the
44 programs up in 8 different categories which limits the fidelity of inferential statistics.
In addition, not all aircraft platform types have data points for years from IOC of between
1 and 40. For this reason, bounds testing and descriptive statistics provided for aircraft
platform type is catered to the available data of the aircraft type. Cutoffs and assumptions
are also made in conjunction with the available data. In addition, CES 4 and 5 are
removed from analysis due to the instability of these categories found in the aggregate
results. Summary statistics for each type of aircraft are presented in Tables 14-21 while
the selections for best bound are included in Appendix B.
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Bombers
Bombers only include the B-1B and B-2A because B-52A has data from years 36
to 55. Data for the two programs only goes to 30 years from IOC which eliminates testing
to 40 years for this category. Table 14 illustrates the summary statistics for bomber
aircraft.
Table 14. Summary Statistics- Bombers

Fighter & Attack
The Fighter & Attack category has data from years 1 to 37 and includes 1 to 11
programs in the calculations of means. The data is naturally truncated at 37 years which
allows for 7 years of data to check for aging. Table 15 shows the summary statistics for
fighter & attack aircraft.
Table 15. Summary Statistics-Fighter & Attack
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Helicopters
There is no determination for the point of stability for the first 10 years because
data starts at year 11. Calculations for helicopters use 1 to 2 programs for means and the
descriptive statistics only summarize from years 11 to 30 for all cost combinations.
Percent stable calculations are also calculated from 11 to 30 years and 11 to 40 years and
shown in table 16.
Table 16. Summary Statistics-Helicopters

Reconnaissance
No data point is available for year 1 and it is assumed to be unstable at that point.
Calculations of the means include from 1 to 3 aircraft. The data also stops at 39 years
which allows for 9 years of aging. Table 17 summarizes the results.
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Table 17. Summary Statistics-Reconnaissance

Special Duty
Data stops at 33 years so analysis is truncated to 30 years. There are 2 to 4
programs used in the calculations of the means. No aging effects are able to be analyzed.
Table 18 summarizes the results.
Table 18. Summary Statistics-Special Duty

Training
Data goes from years 1 to 24 and 35 to 55. We truncate at 24 years from IOC and
the latter part is not analyzed for aging. Training includes 1 to 2 aircraft and is
summarized in table 19.

57

Table 19. Summary Statistics-Training

Transport & Tanker
Transport & Tankers have enough data points to check the stability point to 30
years from IOC as well as from years 30 to 40. This is the only aircraft type that does not
need any extra assumptions or truncations. Mean calculations include data from 2 to 4
programs and summary statistics are found in table 20.
Table 20. Summary Statistics-Transport & Tanker

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
There are only three programs in this aircraft type and it contains data from years
1-11 for 1 to 3 programs. No aging affects are able to be analyzed yet for UAVs because
they are so new relative to other aircraft types. Summary statistics are shown in table 21.
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Table 21. Summary Statistics-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

Aircraft Type Summary
The research compares stability by aircraft type with the assumption that the
descriptive data displayed is an accurate representation of the aircraft type at large. There
are limitations with sample sizes but still significant findings. We focus this analysis by
looking at underlying trends and further investigate where necessary. The first is that the
CPFH metric is the most unstable for 5 of the 8 aircraft types. Helicopters, which exhibit
minor differences in cost types, are a special case for this research because data doesn’t
start until 11 years from IOC. Also, the general differences between rotary aircraft and
fixed wing aircraft are greater than the differences within fixed wing aircraft types.
Cost per TAI was the best metric in the aggregate analysis, with stability
demonstrated at the 10% bound, a trend that appears the same across platform type. For
this reason, the research hones in on cost per TAI as a basis of comparison. Aside from
helicopters, which is hard determine the point of stability, all aircraft types exhibit some
form of stability at 0 to 5 years from IOC which also allows them to be compared.
Looking at Table 22, there are potentially 2 or 3 distinct groupings for the means of
percent differences after stability occurs. Bombers, Fighter/Attack, Training, and
Transport/Tanker all have total CPTAI means around 7% and medians from 5% to 7%.
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Reconnaissance and helicopters are at 8.55% and 9.55% respectively with medians
around 7%. Special duty aircraft and UAVs seem to be different from the rest in the total
CPTAI category by with means around 11% to 12% and medians of 10% to 12%.
Another notable trend not shown in Table 5 is that trainers are less stable in CES 1
(manpower) with a mean around 14% while the other aircraft types are below 10%. This
makes sense due to the rotating number of pilots going through pilot training. Also,
special duty aircraft exhibit more variance in CES 3 (maintenance). The special duty
aircraft in this research are all C-130 variants that are being used for special operations
missions, which may lead to more stress on the aircraft.
Table 22. Total Cost per TAI Summary Statistics (Stable to 30 years from IOC) by
Aircraft Type

Stability Recap
Using the means of percent differences for each year from IOC allows the
research to identify O&S stability properties of aircraft at the top level as well as by
aircraft type. Cost per TAI is the cost type that exhibits the tightest stability and steered
the analysis for stability properties by aircraft type. Though there are no inferential
statistics, the descriptive statistics provided will be helpful for cost estimators in the
future.
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Part 2. Predicting O&S Costs Using Multiple Regression
Developing a model using multiple regression is an iterative process and is made
more robust with certain validating assumptions. If at any point one of the validating
assumptions is failed, corrective action is taken, and the process is started over. The
validating tests used in this analysis include Holm-Bonferroni Correction, Variance
Inflation Factors, Cook’s Distance Test, Shapiro-Wilk Tests, and Breusch-Pagan Tests.
Possible remedies for failure of any of these tests include removal of a variable, removal
of data points, or natural log transformations.
Response Variable
The regression model predicts the total operating cost per total aircraft in the
inventory (total cost per TAI) as an output variable.
Predictor Variables
The following independent variables are the predictor variables included in the
preliminary model. Variables for “Years from IOC” and “Stable vs. Unstable” are created
using the results from the stability portion of this research while all other variables are
obtained directly from the AFTOC database. Through the iterative process of model
building some variables are removed for failing diagnostics.
•
•

•

•

Unit Cost (Continuous Variable): This is the unit cost of the aircraft for the
program
Tempo (Continuous Variable): Tempo is calculated according to the RAND
model described in Chapter III and is the total flight hours in a year divided by the
TAI.
Average Age (Continuous Variable): This variable is the average age of all
aircraft in the program at the end of the year. The RAND model divides this
number by 100 but our research does not.
Location of Lead Logistics Center (Binary Variables): These variables are the
location of the lead air logistics center (ALC). The base case is Ogden Logistics
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•

•

•
•

Center (OO-ALC). Binary variables are created for Warner Robins Air Logistics
Center (WR-ALC), Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) which is now Life Cycle
Management Center, and Oklahoma City Logistics Center (OC-ALC).
Contract vs. Organic Logistics Support (Binary Variables): These variables
describe if the program is currently being maintained by contract logistic support
(CLS) or organic logistics support.
Mission Type (Binary Variables): The mission types explored are the eight from
the stability portion of research and include Bombers, Fighter/Attack, Helicopters,
Reconnaissance, Special Duty, Training, Transport/Tanker, and UAV. The base
case in the research is Transport/Tanker.
Years from IOC (Binary Variables): These variables include years 1 through 30
from IOC to see if any specific years may be significant.
Stable vs. Unstable (Binary Variables): These variable is derived from the
stability portion of research and indicates whether the program is considered
stable or not. Stability starts after 5 years from IOC and coincides with the
stability point for cost per TAI, which is where cost per TAI is stable 80% of the
time at a 10% bound.

Validation Pool
Randomly selecting 80% of the 609 data points to create the model and 20% to
test resulted in 484 (79.47%) data points for the model and 125 (20.53%) data points for
test. Once the initial model passes all validating assumptions, the final output regression
equation is used with the 125 test data points to get predicted values.
Stepwise Regression and Diagnostics
After all predictor variables are put into the 80% model, the stepwise function is
used. Recall from Chapter III that the research uses the stepwise mixed function in JMP
Pro® with a p-value of 0.05 to enter as well as exit the model. The preliminary model
output that passes all diagnostics is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Preliminary Model that Passes all Diagnostics
Holm-Bonferroni Correction
The first diagnostic applied to the model is the Holm-Bonferroni Correction
which is a measure to reduce type I error. This is done by lowering the p-value to reject
the null hypothesis by dividing the alpha (α) level by the number of predictor variables
used in the model. For this analysis, an α of 0.05 is used with 13 predictor variables.
Applying the Holm-Bonferroni correction results in α = 0.05/13 = 0.003846. Only the
stability variable is over this threshold at 0.005 however this is a conservative measure
the variable is kept in the model.
Variance Inflation Factor
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to detect if multicollinearity is present
in the model. Traditionally, a VIF value above 10 is considered to have collinearity with
another variable and should be removed or investigated to find which variables are
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collinear. Shown in Figure 8, all VIF values are below 10 with the highest being 4.77, a
binary variable for Warner-Robbins as the lead logistics center for an aircraft.
Cook’s Distance Test
The finalized preliminary model needs to have data points that are not overly
influential to the overall model. A Cook’s Distance Test checks for this measure and
considers any point to have a value of over 0.5 to be influential to the model. The
preliminary model had one data point with a Cook’s Distance of 0.438 shown in Figure 8.
While this is still under the threshold, analysis of the studentized residuals revealed that
the data point is 6.69 standard deviations away from the mean. The data point in question
was the O&S costs of RQ-4B Global Hawk in its first year from IOC. With this data
point’s temporary removal and re-running regression, the dummy variable for UAV was
no longer significant in the model. This results in removal of the UAV predictor variable
from the model, however the point remains.

Figure 8. Display of Cook’s Distance Plot
Studentized Residuals
The next check is testing the assumption that residual values are normally
distributed. To complete this, we create a histogram of the studentized residuals and
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conduct a Shapiro-Wilks (S-W) test for normality. A histogram of the studentized
residuals as well as S-W test is shown in Figure 9. A normal distribution contains 95% of
the data within 2 standard deviations and 99.7% of the data within 3 standard deviations.
The residuals of our preliminary model are distributed such that 95.25% of the data is
within 2 standard deviations and 98.55% of the data is within 3 standard deviations.
While not exact, it is close to what is expected from a normal distribution.
Figure 9 also shows the S-W test, which the model’s residuals failed statistically.
This means that statistically the curve cannot be considered a normal distribution.
However, looking at the shape of the distribution, the residuals follow the bell shape
curve characteristic of a normal distribution. The exception is that there are more values
centered around zero than a normal distribution which makes this a soft fail of the test.
Values centered around zero are acceptable whereas large spikes on the histogram tails
would be troublesome.

Figure 9: Studentized Residuals and Shapiro-Wilk Test
Breusch-Pagan
The final validation criteria that the model must pass is the Breusch-Pagan test
against heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is the property of having non-constant
variance throughout the range of predicted values. Testing for constant variance requires
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the number of observations (N), degrees of freedom of the model, sum of squared errors
(SSE), and sum of squared residuals (SSR). Figure 10 shows the p-value of the B-P test
with the required values. A low p-value in a Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null
hypothesis that constant variance is exhibited in the model. Figure 11 shows the residuals
by predicted values.

Figure 10. Breuch-Pagan Test for Constant Variance

Figure 11. Residual by Predicted Values Plot
Initially, heteroscedasticity was more prevalent and in an effort to reduce this we
transform the data by applying natural log transformations. The dependent variable, Cost
per TAI is transformed as well as the independent variables for unit cost and tempo. After
these transformations, the p-value of the test statistic is still almost zero, however the
residual by predicted plot does not appear to have any trend. A model does not have
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constant variance if the residual values are close to zero on one end of the predicted
values and far from zero on another end, appearing cone shaped. It is also important to
note that the 7 data points that were outside 3 standard deviations are highlighted in
figure 11 and show again that the issue is arising at the tails and not the middle. Like SW, the test for constant variance is failed but without a distinguishable trend in the
residual by predicted plot and with the failure being caused by outliers, we consider this
to be a soft fail.
Validation of the Model
Once the preliminary model passes all diagnostic tests and assumptions we must
use the 20% validation to validate that the model for accuracy. Validation of the model
involves comparing the Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) and Median Absolute
Percent Error (MdAPE) of the 80% preliminary model to the 20% validation pool. Figure
12 includes a histogram and summary statistics for Absolute Percent Error (APE) of the
80% preliminary model. The MAPE is 1.41% and MdAPE is 1.09% which are both very
close to zero. Figure 13 is a histogram and summary statistics for APE of the 20%
validation pool. The MAPE for the 20% validation pool is 1.37% and the MdAPE is
1.03% which is also very close to zero.

Figure 12. Summary Statistics of Absolute Percent Error (APE) for 80% Model
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Figure 13. Summary Statistics of Absolute Percent Error (APE) for 20% Validation
Pool
In addition to comparing MAPE and MdAPE, we also compare the R2 and
adjusted R2 values of bivariate actual vs. predicted plots for both the 80% model and the
20% validation pool. Figure 14 is the bivariate plot for the 80% model and has an R2 of
0.875 and adjusted R2 of 0.875. Figure 15 is the bivariate plot for the validation pool and
has an R2 of 0.872 and adjusted R2 of 0.871. A comparison of the two plots show that the
values are very close to each other.

Figure 14. Bivariate Plot of Actual vs. Predicted for 80% Model
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Figure 15. Bivariate Plot of Actual vs. Predicted for Validation Pool
The close comparisons of MAPE, MdAPE, and bivariate plots allow us to
conclude that the 80% model is valid compared to the 20% validation pool. From this
point we move forward and develop the final model.
Final Multiple Regression Model
Now that all model assumptions and diagnostics are passed and the model is
considered valid compared to the 20% validation pool the final model is created. The
final model includes all data points and uses the same predictor variables as the
preliminary model and is shown in Figure 16. While 10 is the cut off value for VIF scores
for multicollinearity, the research team dived further into high VIFs and potential
interactions between the variables. The logistics centers had the highest VIFs and were
temporarily removed which caused two binary variables to become less significant,
Stability variable (p-value = 0.0155) and Y Fighter (0.0428). While still significant with
an alpha of 0.05 the two would then fail the Bonferroni-Holm correction and indicated
that they both have interactions with logistics centers. Adding centers back into the model
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one at a time revealed that there are significant interactions between Y Fighter and Y
WR-ALC (p-value < 0.0001) and a moderately significant interaction between the
stability variable and Y ASC (0.00259). These interactions are not captured in the final
model but may affect results of the regression model. It is also important to note that the
model does not show binary variables for Transport/Tanker (Y Transport) or UAV (Y
UAV). This is because the base case is Transport/Tanker and the UAV variable was not
significant in the model. When using the model an estimator would treat a
Transport/Tanker aircraft the same as UAVs and have no input into the model. The same
is true for the binary variable for Ogden Logistics Center (Y OO-ALC) because it is the
base case.

Figure 16. Final Regression Model
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Regression Recap
This portion of analysis started with the original RAND regression model and
added programmatic information from AFTOC. Using results from the stability section of
thesis and AFTOC programmatic information we were able to create variables to predict
total O&S costs per TAI. In the iterative process of model building there are a variety of
diagnostics that must be met in multiple regressions before it can be considered a viable
model. All diagnostics were met and the model set was tested against the test set with
minimal difference in results. The final model is able to explain 87.24% of the variance
in the data set. Due to natural log transformation of variables, once transformed back
from log space, the output is median cost per TAI rather than mean cost per TAI.
Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the results from both the stability properties analysis as well
as the final multiple regression model. Discussed first are stability properties and results
for the WSER. Then we dive into the stability properties for the year to year metric and
different CESs. After a top-level analysis, we compare by aircraft type. Finally, we
discuss the results from the multiple regression model that uses data from AFTOC and a
variable derived from the stability portion. Chapter 5 of this thesis highlights the major
findings for each question. In addition, limitations of the research are pointed out and any
recommendations for future research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide final conclusions made from all analyses,
limitations, and suggestions for future research. Major findings for the stability portion
include determining how many years from IOC stability occurs and to what degree a
program remains stable. There are significant findings for both the WSER metric as well
as the year to year metric. In addition, a statistically significant multiple regression model
was developed to accurately predict total O&S costs per TAI. First, we revisit the four
research questions that were initially proposed in Chapter 1 and discuss the significant
findings for each question. Then, we highlight the limitations of our research and identify
areas for future research to continue.
Research Questions Answered
#1: Using the Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER) 15% threshold for reporting
as a baseline, what is the more accurate, data driven threshold for stability?
Question one is the original purpose of this research and basis for the subsequent
research questions. The first finding in the best bound analysis is that only 3 of the 9
WSER and cost combinations analyzed have 80% stability to 30 years from IOC at the
15% bound. Therefore, we do not recommend the 15% blanket bound as it is not a good
metric for all categories. For the total O&S cost type, stability is first attained around 8 to
9 years and only WSER 2 (Other Logistics Costs) used 15% as its best bound. CPFH uses
the 20% threshold as the best bound for all three of the WSER categories. In comparison
to total O&S costs, CPFH reaches stability earlier than total O&S costs but does have
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higher means and medians. CPTAI has the tightest bounds between all three WSER
categories with 2 of the 3 combinations using the 15% bound.
In regards to the most stable WSER category regardless of cost type it is WSER 2.
WSER 1 (CAM) is the least stable cost type and uses the 20% bound, of which only 1
stays stable more the 80% of the time. Overall, WSER 1 is worst for stability and it is
recommended to use 20% as the bound. The most stable combination of the 9 is CPTAI
WSER 2 where it is 87.5% stable at a 15% bound and has a mean and median of 11.58%
and 11.78% respectively. For aging, 6 out of 9 of the WSER combinations have higher
means and medians in the 30-40 year from IOC range. Most aging appears to be in
WSER 3 (Other O&S Costs). Table 23 summarizes the recommended bound for each
selection as well as descriptive statistics to further explain characteristics.
Table 23. WSER Years to Stability and Bound Recommendation

#2: When can O&S costs of a program be considered stable?
While question one aims to provide a data driven number for the WSER, question
two aims to determine stability for the year to year metric as well as the appropriate
percent bound. The first major finding is that when looking at the five Cost Element
Structures (CES), only the first three display stability properties. CES 4 and 5 do not
display stability at the aggregate level and were not analyzed further. It is important to
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note that this is a reasonable approach because the first three categories make up around
80% of all total O&S costs (O’Hanlon, 2018).
For bounds testing by cost type, CPFH has the highest bounds, followed by total
costs and then CPTAI. This is consistent with the WSER results which further reinforces
the finding. The tightest bounded cost type is CPTAI which got down to the 10% bound
in two of its three categories. The overall best recommended metric for stability is CPTAI
CES 1 which is manpower. This is likely the most stable because it is the manpower
needed per aircraft and it is easy to predict the number of people assigned to an aircraft.
CPTAI total is also a good metric, is stable 80% of the time to 30 years from IOC, and
reaches stability after 5 years from IOC. Total cost includes CESs 4, 5, and 6 and while it
is hard to determine stability for them individually, we can predict some sort of stability
with all six CESs combined. The CPTAI total O&S costs is also the metric used for the
stability variable in the regression portion of the research. Table 24 summarizes when
costs can be considered stable, to what degree, and the percent of time it falls within the
bound up to 30 years from IOC.
Table 24. Year to Year Time to Stability
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#3: How do stability characteristics vary by aircraft platform type?
When looking at stability properties by platform type it is important to note that
there are only comparisons of descriptive statistics. This is due to the small sample size
caused by splitting the data up into the eight different aircraft categories. While values
are compared, some have sample sizes of 1 or 2 while others are above 10 and could
influence data. With that in mind, there are some notable trends that appear to exist
between aircraft. We will talk about trends by cost type (total, CPTAI, CPFH), cost
category (total, CES1, CES2, CES 3), and effects on aging aircraft.
The first trend in cost type is that the CPFH metric requires the highest bounds
and has the highest mean and median values. For helicopters, all cost types are the same.
Of the categories with stability differences in cost type, CPFH is the widest bound for 5
out of 7 aircraft types. Transport/Tanker and UAV are the two that don’t exhibit this
trend and this could be due to the number of flying hours their mission types entail.
CPTAI as a cost group exhibits the most stability which is also in line with findings from
questions 1 and 2.
Notable trends for cost category include CES 3 having the most unstable bounds
while total costs and CES 1 exhibit the most stability. Again, this coincides with the
findings from question 2. For the eight aircraft types, only UAVs exhibited more stability
in CES 3 than CES 1 or 2. This could be due to the fact that they are relatively newer
aircraft or possibly because their missions don’t put as much stress on the aircraft
compared to manned aircraft.
Aging effects are harder to determine because of the available data on each
aircraft type. Aging can only be looked at on 4 of the 8 aircraft types because not all had
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data points for 30 years to 40 years from IOC. We consider a program to have aging
affects if the program is more stable to its best bound from the stability point to 30 years
than it is for 30 to 40 years. The four that were able to be checked for aging are
Fighters/Attack, Helicopters, Reconnaissance, and Transport/Tankers. All but
Reconnaissance demonstrate aging affects as it relates to stability.
Using the trends from cost type and cost category, the best overall metric to
compare stability properties by aircraft type is total O&S cost per TAI. While it is not
perfect, this combination exhibits stability to the tightest bound and allows us to
distinguish any differences between the groups. Training, Transport/ Tanker, Bombers,
and Fighter/ Attack exhibit the most stability, Reconnaissance and Helicopters exhibit
moderate stability, and Helicopters and UAVs exhibit the least amount of stability. Table
25 illustrates how aircraft types compare for the total O&S cost per TAI metric.
Table 25. Total Cost per TAI Summary Statistics (Stable to 30 years from IOC) by
Aircraft Type
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#4: Using multiple regression, how accurately can we predict O&S costs for a given year
using explanatory variables?
The major finding for this question is that we are able to accurately predict O&S
costs of a given aircraft based on time from IOC and other variables available from
AFTOC. The final model is able to explain 87.24% of the variance in the data (Adjusted
R2) all while passing the diagnostics required for robust model building. CPTAI Total
O&S costs is used for the stability variable in the model and was the second best overall
metric in the stability portion only to CPTAI CES 1. Using CPTAI Total also aligns with
the original regression model created by RAND. It is important to note that the dependent
variable is the natural log of total cost per TAI. When actually using the model, the cost
estimator must transform the output from log space to normal space and the value given
would be a median rather than mean value. This model has value as a top level cross
check or an initial basis for a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate early in a
program’s lifecycle.
The explanatory variables include natural log Tempo (Flight hours/TAI), natural
log Unit Cost, Average Age of the aircraft in the fleet, Stability, Location of Lead
Logistics Center, and aircraft platform type (technology). All individual variables are
significant. Figure 17 displays the percentage at a grouped level of contribution to
standard beta while Figure 18 displays the percentage that each individual predictor
variable contributes. Aircraft type is the largest percent of standard beta with 36%,
followed by Logistics Center (22%), and then Ln Unit Cost (20%). The smallest
contributor to standard beta is Stability with 2%.
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Percentage of Standard Beta (Grouped)
Stable-2%

Avg Age-7%

Ln Tempo13%

Aircraft Type36%

LN Unit Cost20%
Logistics
Center-22%

Figure 17. Percentage of Standard Beta Grouped by Variable Type

Percentage of Standard Beta (Individual)
Y Special- 5%

Y Helo-2%

Stable-2%
LN Unit Cost-20%

Y OC-ALC-6%
Y ASC-6%

Y Fighter-6%

Ln Tempo-13%

Y Bomber-7%

Avg Age-7%

Y WR-ALC-10%
Y Trainer-8%

Y Recon-8%

Figure 18. Percentage of Standard Beta by Individual Variable

78

Limitations
The largest limitation when trying to determine stability is that the research
standardizes by years from IOC. In theory it is a reasonable way to standardize, but in
reality, programs distinguish initial capability differently. Programs may declare IOC
earlier than what it should be due to schedule or other pressures. Not every program
declares IOC the same way but IOC is better than full rate production because they are
already incurring O&S costs by that point. In some cases, the program incurs O&S for
multiple years before declaring IOC which could also skew the data to show stability
from IOC sooner than it should. Another point to be made with IOC dates is that the
research team ignored the month that IOC was declared. It is assumed that if a program
declared IOC in a year, its costs for one year from IOC would end on December 31 of the
next year. However, this would skew the data at MOST one year if a program declared
IOC in January. For simplicity, the year that program declares IOC is determined to be
year zero. Again, this affects the stability portion more but also affects the stability
variable used in the regression portion of analysis.
Another limitation in the stability portion is that when aggregating data by years
from IOC the research team used the mean of percent differences. As noted in Chapter 3,
means were chosen over do the median percent difference because it skews the data
towards instability. We want to be as conservative as possible to counteract any other
limitations of the research. Descriptive statistics using mean and median are provided but
these descriptions are for the means of the aircraft for each year from IOC.
The scope of the research only including Air Force aircraft is another limitation.
The data used comes from AFTOC which only provides Air Force aircraft, therefore it is
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possible that different services could exhibit different properties for aircraft. In addition,
the methodology may not hold with other types of programs such as ship programs, space
programs, or munitions programs. The same methodology however could be applied to
these other types of programs to determine if stability properties exist.
In addition, the variable for tempo has flight hours in it. This variable relies on the
ability to properly assess what the number of flight hours are going to be in a given year.
There are some laws that restrict flight hours which can be helpful to the tempo variable
but it still relies on a projection. Also, there is an assumption that the unit cost given in
AFTOC is the true unit cost for a program. For newer programs that aim to use the
model, unit cost may be another variable that is hard to distinguish because there may be
a variety of factors that could change the final unit cost. The final variable that may be
limited is the stability variable, which relies on the results from the first portion of this
thesis to be derived. As discussed, there are limitations with the stability portion of
research so the actual use of the stability variable may have inaccuracies. However, the
stability variable contributes only 2% percent of standard beta so it is likely not
troublesome.
Another limitation to the regression portion is that overhauled programs were
removed. Recall from Chapter 4 that five programs were removed because they had a
major overhaul in the program that resulted in a new MDS and new unit cost for that
specific MDS. Our data relied on grouping the aircraft variants by time from IOC but we
could not have programs in the model with two different unit costs for the same program.
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Considerations for Further Research
•

Explore smaller increments in bounds rather than using 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%.
This would involve exploring the best bound selection and going to smaller
increments. For example, if the best bound was 15% then process could be done
to explore 11%, 12%, 13, and 14% as thresholds.

•

Use the same methodology for stability to investigate properties of other services
or other types of programs. The VAMOSC database provides O&S data for other
services and types of programs. For other services aircraft, comparisons in
stability properties could be made with Air Force aircraft programs.

•

Investigate why cost element 3 (CES 3) or WSER centralized asset management
costs (WSER 1) do not exhibit stability properties. Could test a variety of
programmatic variables provided by AFTOC to see why programs stabilize or
not.

•

In addition, investigate CES 4, 5, 6 for stability properties.

•

Create a regression model to predict O&S costs for other services aircraft or
programs using the available programmatic data provided by VAMOSC.

Chapter Summary
Programs that are in the sustainment phase face perpetual funding issues. If we
are able to better predict when these costs stabilize, then it is easier to budget properly
across all programs. Additionally, stability allows cost estimators to know when they can
use actual costs for a basis of estimate methodology rather than using data from
analogous programs.
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This chapters first discusses the WSER and provides new threshold
recommendations for reporting cost overruns. From there, it turns to the perspective of
the cost estimator and helps discern when O&S costs can be considered stable with some
degree of fidelity. Then an analysis of these stability properties is applied to different
aircraft types to determine if there are any differences. While there are no inferential
statistics due to sample size, there are evident trends that are expressed for different
aircraft types. Assuming that the data is an actual representation of real programs for that
specific type, this can also be helpful for cost estimators when trying to determine a
stability point for O&S costs when working on a specific program. The aggregate level
data coupled with the data for each aircraft type can help estimators and leaders in
decision making.
The second part of Chapter 5 shows the results from the regression portion of
analysis. We show that the multiple regression model does accurately predict the total
O&S cost per TAI for aircraft with the help of certain predictor variables. While tempo
and unit cost can be hard to determine accurately, the other predictor variables help
provide for a robust model that is able to describe around 88% of the variance in the data
researched.
Given the relatively recent emphasis on O&S costs, research for O&S estimating
is still burgeoning. Research to help drive the field of O&S estimating forward has been
happening but this is the first research on investigating stability properties for O&S cost.
Cost estimators will now have added a set of tools to help determine when stability
occurs and a top level cross check for O&S costs per aircraft.
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Appendix A: Mean Percent Difference by Cost Type
Total O&S
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Cost Per Fly Hour (CPFH)

84

Cost Per Total Aircraft in the Inventory (CPTAI)
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Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER) Categories
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Appendix B: Best Bound Selections by Aircraft Type
Bomber
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Fighter/Attack

88

Helicopters

89

Reconnaissance

90

Special Duty

91

Training

92

Transport/Tanker

93

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
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